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Abstract 
The degree of income inequality in Sweden has varied substantially since the 
1970s. This study analyzes whether this variation has affected the crime rate 
using a panel of Swedish county-level data for the period 1973–2000. We con-
sider various measures of income inequality to evaluate which part of the dis-
tribution that matters most in determining crime rates. Our results indicate that 
there is a statistically significant positive effect of the proportion of the popula-
tion with an income below 10 percent of median income on the incidence of 
property crime. Moreover, the unemployment rate has a positive effect on the 
incidence of the number of overall crime, auto thefts and robberies. The results 
look different for the violent crime category assault. 
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1 Introduction 
Earlier research has shown that the unemployment rate affects some major 
crime categories, especially property crime, in Sweden.
1 Higher unemployment 
leads to e.g. more auto theft and burglary. But is it merely a sudden, and often 
time-limited, decrease in income from an unexpected unemployment spell that 
influences the individual’s decision on whether or not to commit a crime? Con-
sidering the far-reaching consequences of detection, crime rates should be more 
responsive to long-term changes in labor market opportunities.  
Economic theories of crime explain variations in crime rates through the 
varying incentives and deterrents that face individuals. Following Becker 
(1968), the individual chooses whether or not to engage in criminal activities 
by comparing the returns from those activities to the returns from working 
legally. Presumably the expected returns to illegal activities are to a great 
extent depending on the opportunities provided by potential victims and could 
therefore be seen as proportional to the mean income in the society. The cost of 
committing crime however increases with the potential legal income of the 
criminal through the opportunity cost of time. In a society with considerable 
income inequality the gap between the mean income and the potential legal 
income of low-skilled workers will be large and hence give incentives for 
people at the bottom part of the income distribution to commit crime. Being at 
the lower end of the income distribution must be considered as a more long-
term condition than being temporarily unemployed, hence income inequality 
reflects long-term labor market opportunities to a greater extent than 
unemployment rates do.  
For reviews of the literature on the link between income inequality and 
crime, see e.g. Bourguignon (2001), Eide (1999) and Freeman (1999). As one 
of the first empirical papers on the economics of crime Ehrlich (1973) analyzed 
the variations of crime rates across U.S. states and found a strong positive 
correlation between income inequality, measured by the percentage of the 
population with an income below one half of median income, and property 
crime. More recently, Gould et al (2002) use U.S. county-level data and show 
that the decline in wages of unskilled men can explain more than 50 percent of 
                                                      
1 See Edmark (2003) and Nilsson and Agell (2003). 
  1the increase in both violent and property crime during the 1980s and 1990s.
2 
Machin and Meghir (2000) find an effect of wages of less skilled workers in 
the U.K. on property crime using data on police force areas for the period 
1975–1996.
3 Bourguignon et al (2002) argue that criminals in Colombia are to 
be found among people living in households where income per capita is below 
80 percent of the mean. The share of the population in that group and their 
mean income relative to the overall population appear to be main determinants 
of the variations in the property crime rate. The literature thus indicates a link 
between crime and income inequality. This paper studies what part of the 
income distribution that matters most in determining Swedish crime rates and 
whether this link holds for both property and violent crime.  
This paper uses a new panel dataset covering all Swedish counties during 
the period 1973–2000. The long time period contains considerable variations in 
the income distribution. Figure 1 illustrates the evolution of the Gini-
coefficient. From the beginning of the 1980s until today the spread of the 
distribution of pre-tax earnings has increased with the trend becoming even 
more evident in the 1990s.
4 This study analyzes whether this variation in the 
income distribution has affected the overall crime rate as well as specific 
property and violent crime rates. We consider several measures of income ine-
quality in trying to evaluate if there is a specific part of the income distribution 







                                                      
2 Other papers studying the effect of income inequality on violent crime are Demombynes and 
Özler (2002), Entorf and Spengler (2000), Fajnzylber et al (2002) and Kelly (2000). 
3 Also, Grogger (1998) uses individual level data and conclude that falling real wages played an 
important role in the increase of youth crime during the 1970s and 1980s in the U.S. Freeman 
(1994, 1996) discusses the role of falling real earnings of the less educated in the, despite mas-
sive imprisonment of criminals, high crime rate in the U.S. Imrohoroglu et al (2000) also con-
clude that increased inequality has prevented a larger decline in crime in the U.S. 
4 See e.g. Edin and Holmlund (1995) for a discussion on the evolution of wage dispersion in 
Sweden. 






















Figure 1 The Gini-coefficient using pre-tax earnings. The Gini-coefficient is the na-
tional mean of the Gini-coefficients of all counties each year. The measure is calculated 
using the individual earnings measure in LINDA for all men aged 25–64.  
 
The unique aspect of this paper is that we have access to individual-level 
income information, which allows us to construct various measures of earnings 
inequality. We construct measures of the changes in the income distribution on 
the county-level from an individual-level register-based longitudinal dataset 
(LINDA), which is a representative sample covering 3.4 percent of the 
population annually.
5 We will consider measures of income inequality based on 
individual labor earnings.
6 In addition to our measures of earnings inequality, 
we control for various demographic and socio-economic characteristics of the 
county and include county and time fixed effects as well as county-specific 
time trends. In a sensitivity analysis we also include deterrence variables as 
regressors and estimate a dynamic specification.  
We find that there is a statistically significant positive effect of the propor-
tion of the population with an income below 10 percent of the median income 
on the incidence of property crime. The results look very different for the 
violent crime category assault. Moreover, the unemployment rate has a positive 
effect on the incidence of the number of overall crime, auto thefts and robberies 
                                                      
5 The data set includes approximately 300,000 individuals each year. For details about the data 
set see Edin and Fredriksson (2000). 
6 It would also be of interest to consider measures of income inequality based on disposable 
income. Disposable income is, however, only included in LINDA since 1978, and the definition 
of the variable has changed numerous times. 
  3even when controlling for the size of the low-income group separately. These 
results correspond to the findings in Nilsson and Agell (2003). Furthermore, 
our empirical findings suggest that Swedish crime rates suffer from a high 
degree of inertia. 
The next section presents a simple model of the link between income ine-
quality and property crime. Section 3 describes the data and the empirical 
specification and in section 4 the basic results on the link between income ine-
quality and property crime are reported. Section 5 analyzes the effect of income 
inequality on violent crime and discusses alternative econometric specifica-
tions. The final section summarizes. 
 
2  A simple model 
In the economic theory of crime an individual chooses between legal and 
illegal activities by comparing the returns to these activities within the frame-
work of the economic theory of choice under uncertainty. It is not necessarily a 
choice between two mutually exclusive activities but a choice of determining 
the optimal allocation of time between competing legal and illegal activities.   
The expected returns to illegal activities depend on the opportunities pro-
vided by potential victims of crime. If criminals were unable to choose their 
targets the expected gain from crime would be proportional to the mean income 
in society. The cost of devoting time to illegal activities, however, depends on 
the opportunity cost of time. The opportunity cost is the returns to legal 
activities, which is a function of the individual’s ability, education and other 
legitimate training. In a society with considerable income inequality the gap 
between the mean income and the potential legal earnings of low-skilled 
workers will be large and hence give incentives for people at the bottom part of 
the income distribution to commit crime.  
A simple model may clarify the issues. Consider an individual’s choice 
between working and committing crime to gain income during a single period. 
We assume that crime and legal labor market activity are mutually exclusive 
activities, and that the individual is faced with the option of either going to 
work, or to spend the period committing one crime. Let y be the individual’s 
income from legal labor market activity,  y  the mean income in society, and t 
the expected returns to illegal activity (which is the same as the percentage loss 
to a victimized individual). Further, let  V µ  be the risk of being victimized,  A µ  
the risk of apprehension for a criminal, δ  the (psychic) disutility cost from 
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being victimized, f a fine payable in case of apprehension, and κ  any (psychic) 
disutility cost from being punished for a crime. In case the criminal is appre-
hended, we assume that the stolen amount is returned to the victim. Finally, we 
assume that all individuals are alike, except for the fact that they differ with 
respect to their legal labor market income, y.  
Based on this notation the expected value from participating in legal activity 
can be written as: 
 
     [ ] δ µ µ µ µ − + − − + − = ) ( )) 1 ( ( ) 1 ( ) ( ) 1 ( y U t y U y U EV A A V V L     (1) 
 
The expected value from participating in illegal activities is: 
 
                              ) ) ( ( ) ( ) 1 ( κ µ µ − − + − = f U y t U EV A A I             (2)  
 
In writing (1), we have assumed that criminals only steal money from law-
abiding citizens, which implies that criminals do not bother about the risk of 
being victimized. Modifying this assumption is straightforward, but does not 
alter our argument.  
If the expected returns from crime exceed those from legal activities the 
individual will engage in criminal activities. Thus depending on whether   
is greater or smaller than   the individual will become an ordinary worker 
or a criminal. For our purpose it is useful to identify the individual who is just 
indifferent between legal market work and illegal activity. Formally, we solve 
for that cut-off level of labor market income  , which gives us equality 
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Because of the simple form of the return functions (1) and (2), it follows read-
ily that every individual with labor market income y below   will choose to 
become a criminal while everyone with income greater than   will choose 
legal labor market activity. Furthermore, it is a tedious but straightforward ex-


































   
























Equation (4) states that the minimum expected legal income required for 
someone not to commit a crime (i) increases with mean income, (ii) increases 
with the risk of victimization, (iii) decreases with the risk of apprehension, (iv) 
increases with the disutility cost of being victimized, (v) decreases with the 
disutility cost from being punished for a crime, (vi) increases with the expected 
returns to illegal activity and (vii) decreases with the fine payable in case of 
apprehension. 
Next, we let   be the population density function, with support over the 
interval [ . We may define the overall number of crimes in our econ-
omy with the help of the following integral: 
() y f
] max min, y y
 






The crime rate will depend on the relative number of people with low regular 
labor market incomes (i.e. the population densities in the interval between   




y ), and on e.g. deterrence variables capturing the risk and disutility of 
being apprehended. From a policy point of view, the model predicts that poli-
cies that improve the labor market prospects of individuals at the low-end of 
the ability distribution will be quite successful in reducing the crime rate. 
Finally, a disclaimer is in order. Though the model conveys useful intuition, 
it only captures the link between income inequality and property crime. Hence, 
in section 5 where we consider the effect of income inequality on assault we 
cannot expect the results to comply with the model. Also, the model has the 
unrealistic implication that every agent with low labor market ability will be-
come a criminal. However, in reality it is often the case that rich individuals 
commit crimes to become even richer, a phenomenon that attracts a lot of at-
tention in the media. Thus, we do not want to link our econometric specifica-
tions very tightly to this model, but we believe that the model, in a satisfying 
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way, serves as guidance for how to view the effect of income inequality on 
property crime. 
 
3  Data and econometric specification 
Our panel data set includes annual data from 21 Swedish counties for the pe-
riod 1973–2000.
7 The starting point for our econometric analysis is the follow-
ing model: 
 
                   it it it t i t i it X I time Crime ε β θ γ λ α + + + + + =         (6) 
 
where   is the log of the number of crimes reported to the police per 
100,000 residents of the crime category investigated, 
it Crime
i α  and  t λ  are county and 
year fixed effects and  i γ  is the county-specific coefficient on a linear time 
trend.
8   represents our various measures of earnings inequality and   is a 
vector of other control variables. The estimated coefficients should be in-
terpreted as semi-elasticities, i.e. they show the percentage change in the crime 
rate due to a unit change in any of the explanatory variables. All variables are 
weighted by the county and time specific population. 
it I it X
The crime data were provided by The National Council for Crime Preven-
tion (BRÅ). We focus primarily on the effect of income inequality on the 
overall crime rate and on three major property crime-categories: burglary, auto 
theft and robbery. As a sidetrack we also consider the effect of income 
inequality on the assault rate in section 5. Table 1 shows the descriptive 
statistics for the crime variables. Evidently, property crimes are far more 
common than violent crime. The county of Stockholm accounts for all the 
maximum-values of our crime variables whereas the counties of Gotland, 
Blekinge and Jämtland share the minimum-values. 
                                                      
7 During this period there have been changes in the county-structure, in 1997 Kristianstad and 
Malmöhus county jointly became Skåne county and in 1998 Göteborg- & Bohus-county, Älvs-
borg and Skaraborg were merged into Västra Götalands county. We use the latter classification 
throughout the whole period, leaving us with 21 counties. 
8 Assuming that unobserved covariates are constant within a county for 28 years or that they are 
changing over time in accordance with a national time trend is restrictive. Including county-
specific trends relaxes the specification and allows the trend to vary across counties. For a more 
detailed discussion on the issue, see Friedberg (1998) and Raphael and Winter-Ebmer (2001). 
  7Table 1 Descriptive statistics, crime variables 
Variables   Min   Max   Mean   Standard deviation  
All crimes   5087   21600.8   10464.9   2835.6  
Burglary   687.1   3383.4   1383.1   416.2  
Auto theft   119.9   1926.3   432.8   236.5  
Robbery   1.8   210.7   30.4   30.1  
Assault   104.9   965.8   376   162.8  
Note: The crime data was provided by The National Council for Crime Prevention. All crime categories are 
expressed as the annual incidence per 100,000 residents. Our complete panel consists of 588 observations for 
21 counties during the period 1973–2000. 
 
Figures 2–4 show the evolution of the different crime categories during the 
last three decades. All crime rates have increased except the burglary rate, 



































Figure 2 The total number of crimes per 100,000 inhabitants reported to the police is 
on the left axis and the number of burglaries per 100,000 inhabitants on the right. 































Figure 3 The number of auto thefts per 100,000 reported to the police is on the left axis 






















Figure 4 The number of assaults reported to the police per 100,000 inhabitants. 
 
The data used to construct measures of the development of the income dis-
tribution are taken from the register-based longitudinal data set LINDA. The 
data set is a representative sample of the population starting in 1960 and it cov-
ers 3.4 percent of the population annually, which implies approximately 
300,000 individuals. We focus on reported earnings of the male population in 
working age 25–64, giving us a sample of about 75,000 individuals per year. 
  9The reason for only using the earnings of males is that during the relevant pe-
riod there was a large shift in female labor market participation. Including the 




Table 2 Descriptive statistics, income variables (annual earnings in 1980 SEK) 
Variables   Min   Max   Mean   Standard   
deviation  
10th percentile  0   28364.1   7549.06   7668.71  
90th percentile   87158.65   189542.4   114070.4   13596.27  
Gini-coefficient   0.258   0.459   0.330   0.045  
Proportion in relative poverty:              
10 % of median income   0.045   0.214   0.115   0.039  
20 % of median income   0.060   0.242   0.136   0.043  
40 % of median income   0.102   0.294   0.182   0.048  
Mean earnings   54341.96   101884.1   69758.94   6395.97  
Note: All income variables are computed from the individual annual earnings measure included in LINDA. 
Our complete panel consists of 588 observations for 21 counties during the period 1973–2000. The variables 
are more carefully explained in Appendix. 
 
We construct measures of the county-specific income distribution using a 
measure of earnings that includes sickness benefits but not pensions and unem-
ployment insurance, given that this definition of the earnings variable is the 
most consistent over time.
10 Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics for our 
various measures of income inequality, the earnings of the 10
th and 90
th 
percentile, the Gini-coefficient, various definitions of the proportion of 
relatively poor and the overall mean income. Figure 5 conveys that the 
proportion of relatively poor increased in the beginning of the 1990s. Figure 6 
presents the measures we use as proxies for the general prosperity of the area. 
                                                      
9 As an alternative to using males aged 25-64 we decreased the age ceiling to 55, attempting to 
exclude the increasing number of individuals receiving early age retirement possibly influencing 
the income measures. Eliminating this age group gives us a sample of 60,000 individuals per 
year. However, using the smaller age group does not change the results. 
10 The measure in 1973 includes pensions but excludes sickness benefits and unemployment 
insurance, which makes it inconsistent with the measure during later years. We have checked 
whether this matters by estimating all specification using a shorter panel (1974-2000), and the 
results are not affected. A more detailed description of our income measures is available in Ap-
pendix. 
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The earnings of the 90
th percentile and the mean earnings measure evolved in 
the same manner until the beginning of the 1990s, when the difference between 
them increased and the high-income group got better off compared to the rest 
of the population. Although we focus on the bottom part of the distribution we 
also take the general prosperity of the area into account, comparing the 
situation of the low-income group with that of the rest of the population/the 
high-income group. As a measure of the low-income group we use different 
definitions of the proportion of relatively poor residing in the county; the 
proportion of the population with an income below 10, 20 and 40 percent of 
median income. In our baseline specification the 90
th percentile reflects the 
characteristics of the high-income group. We will also include an interaction of 
the low- and high-income measures, which will capture a potential effect of the 
two different income-groups residing in proximity to each other. We cannot 
predict the sign of the coefficient on this interaction. It could turn out positive 
if the interaction-term captures a larger supply of theft-worthy goods within 
reach for a large number of poor individuals to steal. It could, on the other 
hand, turn out negative if the rich invest more resources to protect themselves 
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Figure 5 The relative poverty measures above are the national mean of the proportion 
of individuals with earnings less than 10, 20 and 40 percent of median earnings in all 
counties each year. The measures are calculated using the individual earnings measure 
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Figure 6 The earnings measures are the national means of corresponding measures in 
all counties each year. The measures are calculated using the individual earnings 
measure in LINDA for all men aged 25–64. 
 
In addition to these income variables we also control for a possible separate 
effect of unemployment on crime. Nilsson and Agell (2003) identify an effect 
of unemployment on the incidence of overall crime, burglary and auto theft, 
hence excluding the unemployment rate from the analysis could lead to biased 
estimates. The effect of unemployment on crime is probably both a lack-of-
activity effect and an income effect. Unfortunately we cannot separate the two 
effects, potentially causing the unemployment coefficient to capture part of the 
income inequality effect that we are interested in here. The inclusion of the 
unemployment rate in the analysis may therefore lead to under-estimated coef-
ficients on the income distribution variables.
11
In the analysis we control for various socio-economic and demographic 
factors, see Table 3. Statistics Sweden has provided us with data on the propor-
tion of males aged 15–24, the proportion of foreign citizens
12 and the number 
of divorced individuals. The first two variables will account for the over-
representation of those groups in the crime statistics and could be considered as 
determining the risk of being victimized. The number of divorced individuals is 
                                                      
11 It should be noted that the unemployment insurance is not included in the earnings variables, 
hence all unemployed are registered as having zero earnings during their unemployment spell. 
12 Preferably we would include the proportion of individuals not born in Sweden but we do not 
have data on this before 1984. However, the two variables are highly correlated. 
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included to reflect the family situation for young people. Using U.S. data Levitt 
and Lochner (2001) find that unstable families have a strong effect on juvenile 
crime. Since young individuals are responsible for a disproportionate share of 
many crimes and since single parent households often have low incomes, not 
controlling for the family situation of young people might lead to omitted vari-
able bias. All variables are more carefully explained in Appendix where also 
the data sources are included. 
 
Table 3 Descriptive statistics, control variables  
Variables   Min   Max   Mean   Standard deviation  
Unemployment   0.008   0.128   0.042   0.025  
Proportion of males aged 15–24   0.055   0.082   0.068   0.005  
Proportion foreign citizens   0.006   0.100   0.039   0.020  
Proportion divorced   0.020   0.103   0.059   0.017  
Police officers   79.89   294.49   162.59   30.29  
Clear-up rates:              
   All crimes   0.11   0.35   0.210   0.038  
   Assault    0.21   0.57   0.357   0.071  
   Auto theft   0.04   0.49   0.194   0.090  
   Burglary   0.02   0.7   0.104   0.063  
   Robbery   0.06   0.82   0.287   0.111  
Note: The first three variables have been provided by Statistics Sweden. Police officers is number of em-
ployed police officers per 100,000 inhabitants and was provided by The National Police Board. The clear-up 
rates are measured as the percentage of all reported crimes (in one specific category) that are solved the same 
year that they are reported. The clear-up rates were provided by The National Council for Crime Prevention. 
Our complete panel consists of 588 observations for 21 counties during the period 1973–2000. 
 
In the empirical specification we also include fixed effects which is equiva-
lent to using within groups estimation, hence all variables are expressed as 
deviations from their county and time specific means. Besides from controlling 
for omitted time invariant heterogeneity these fixed effects to some extent help 
in solving the potential problem of measurement error. The number of recorded 
crimes most likely underestimates true criminal activity. If this measurement 
error varies systematically across counties over time our results could be 
biased. The empirical specification with fixed effects helps to reduce this 
problem by eliminating the influence of measurement errors that (a) remains 
constant over time, (b) varies in accordance with a general time-trend and (c) 
  13follows the county-specific time-trend.
13 The standard errors are throughout the 
paper robust to heteroscedasticity.
14
 
4 Basic  results 
When studying the effect of income inequality on property crime it is not clear 
which part of the distribution that matters most. We focus primarily on the 
bottom part of the distribution, since the theory predicts that income inequality 
gives incentives for people at the bottom part of the income distribution to 
commit crime. However, we also want to control for the possibility that a 
greater supply of theft-worthy goods in prosperous areas may induce more 
property crime, as well as the possibility that prosperous areas invest more 
resources in crime preventing activities possibly reducing property crime.  
Table 4 presents the results from three specifications where the overall 
crime rate is the dependent variable. The specifications use different measures 
of the proportion of the population living in relative poverty: the proportion of 
the population with an income below 10 (specification 1), 20 (specification 2) 
and 40 percent (specification 3) of median income. The 90
th percentile reflects 
the characteristics of the high-income group and the interaction of the low- and 
high-income measures capture a potential effect of the two different income-
groups residing in proximity to each other as explained above.  
The coefficient on the proportion of relatively poor is significant in all 
specifications. The magnitude of the coefficient is smaller when a larger 
proportion is considered poor, suggesting that most of the effect is coming 
from the really low end of the income distribution. A one-percentage point in-
crease in the proportion of the population with an income below 10 percent (40 
percent) of median income would imply a 2.9 (2.0) percent increase in the 
overall crime rate. An increase of the 90
th percentile would also raise the num-
ber of crimes, possibly reflecting the effect of a greater supply of theft-worthy 
goods, although the effect seems to be small. The coefficient on the interaction 
term shows a negative (and in two specifications statistically significant) result. 
                                                      
13 See Nilsson and Agell (2003) for a more detailed discussion concerning measurement errors in 
Swedish crime data. 
14 We have chosen not to use the cluster-estimator since it is known to have good properties only 
when the number of groups is large relative to the number of units with the clusters. For a discus-
sion on inference problems in the presence of group effects when the number of groups is small, 
see for example Wooldridge (2002, 2003). 
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We had anticipated a positive effect of the two different income-groups resid-
ing in proximity to each other when prospective criminals have access to a 
larger supply of theft-worthy goods. This negative coefficient could potentially 
be interpreted as the rich protecting themselves more when the proportion of 
relatively poor increases. According to the coefficient on the unemployment 
variable a one-percentage point drop in the unemployment rate would decrease 
the overall crime rate by 1.1 percent, a result in accordance with the findings of 
Nilsson and Agell (2003).  
 
Table 4 Basic results, overall crime  
   (1)   (2)   (3)  
Relative poverty, 10 percent   2.898***        
   (1.113)        
Relative poverty, 20 percent      2.226**     
      (1.023)     
Relative poverty, 40 percent         2.004**  
         (0.953)  
90
th percentile   4.8e-06**   4.5e-06**   4.4e-06*  
   (2.3e-06)   (2.3e-06)   (2.34e-06)  
Interaction   -1.6e-05*   -1.4e-05*   -9.7e-06  
   (8.7e-06)   (8.1e-06)   (7.8e-06)  
Unemployment   1.109*   1.103*   1.024*  
   (0.618)   (0.624)   (0.623)  
Males aged 15–24   0.361   1.875   1.587  
   (2.527)   (2.520)   (2.543)  
Foreign citizens   2.497**   2.740**   2.885**  
   (1.223)   (1.227)   (1.243)  
Divorced   20.337***   19.367***   19.721***  
   (3.815)   (3.803)   (3.873)  
Adjusted R-square   0.968   0.968   0.968  
Note: The interaction-term is an interaction of the relative poverty measure and the 90
th percentile. Standard 
errors are in parenthesis. All standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity. In addition to the variables 
shown in the table, all regressions include a complete set of municipality and year effects as well as linear 
county-specific trends. Our complete panel consists of 588 observations for 21 counties during the period 
1973–2000. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively. 
 
The coefficients on the remaining control variables also show interesting 
results. A one-percentage point increase in the proportion of divorced 
individuals would (everything else held constant) increase the overall crime 
  15rate with close to 20 percent. A corresponding change in the proportion of 
foreign citizens would increase the overall crime rate with 2.5 percent. At the 
same time, the proportion of young men seems to have no separate effect on 
the overall crime rate. 
Although we have found some evidence of a link between income inequal-
ity and crime we cannot expect to have seen the full picture when only having 
considered the overall crime rate. The measure of overall crime includes many 
different crime categories and we do not expect economic factors to have the 
same effect on all of them. We will continue by studying the effect of income 
inequality on more specific crime categories.  
 
Table 5 Basic results, burglary  
   (1)   (2)   (3)  
Relative poverty, 10 percent   5.893***        
   (1.870)        
Relative poverty, 20 percent      5.050***     
      (1.728)     
Relative poverty, 40 percent         3.978***  
         (1.583)  
90
th percentile   5.7e-06   5.9e-06   5.8e-06  
   (3.9e-06)   (3.9e-06)   (4.0e-06)  
Interaction   -4.8e-05***   -4.3e-05***   -3.2e-05  
   (1.4e-05)   (1.3e-05)   (1.3e-05)  
Unemployment   1.405   1.409   1.487*  
   (0.891)   (0.897)   (0.901)  
Males aged 15–24   -0.775   -0.413   -0.798  
   (3.859)   (3.827)   (3.804)  
Foreign citizens   -1.496   -1.431   -1.487  
   (2.101)   (2.085)   (2.078)  
Divorced   31.560***   30.699***   31.448***  
   (6.125)   (6.188)   (6.179)  
Adjusted R-square   0.927   0.927   0.926  
Note: The interaction-term is an interaction of the relative poverty measure and the 90
th percentile. Standard 
errors are in parenthesis. All standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity. In addition to the variables 
shown in the table, all regressions include a complete set of municipality and year effects as well as linear 
county-specific trends. Our complete panel consists of 588 observations for 21 counties during the period 
1973–2000. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively. 
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Tables 5–7 show results for the same three specifications as above, with the 
dependent variable being the three specific crime categories auto theft, burglary 
and robbery. The coefficients on the different measures of the proportion of 
relatively poor are significant at the one-percent level for burglary and auto 
theft. A one-percentage point increase in the proportion of the population with 
an income below 10 percent (40 percent) of median income would imply a 5.9 
(4.0) percent increase in the burglary rate and a 22.1 (15.8) percent increase in 
the number of auto thefts.  
 
Table 6 Basic results, auto theft  
   (1)   (2)   (3)  
Relative poverty, 10 percent   22.140***        
   (3.456)        
Relative poverty, 20 percent      20.424***     
      (3.229)     
Relative poverty, 40 percent         15.813***  
         (3.331)  
90
th percentile   1.9e-05***   2.1e-05***   2.0e-05***  
   (6.8e-06)   (7.0e-06)   (7.8e-06)  
Interaction   -0.0002***   -0.0002***   -0.0001***  
   (2.8e-05)   (2.6e-05)   (2.7e-05)  
Unemployment   4.666***   4.601***   4.760***  
   (1.633)   (1.633)   (1.672)  
Males aged 15–24   -2.908   -2.599   -2.579  
   (6.278)   (6.278)   (6.424)  
Foreign citizens   -5.459   -5.376   -5.268  
   (3.412)   (3.452)   (3.580)  
Divorced   43.087***   42.403***   40.915***  
   (9.864)   (9.904)   (10.277)  
Adjusted R-square   0.939   0.939   0.937  
Note: The interaction-term is an interaction of the relative poverty measure and the 90
th percentile. Standard 
errors are in parenthesis. All standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity. In addition to the variables 
shown in the table, all regressions include a complete set of municipality and year effects as well as linear 
county-specific trends. Our complete panel consists of 588 observations for 21 counties during the period 
1973–2000. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively. 
 
As for overall crime, increasing the proportion to be considered relatively poor 
decreases the magnitude of the coefficient. For robbery the coefficient on the 
proportion of relatively poor is not as precisely estimated, as for burglary and 
  17auto theft, but it still implies a 9.1 percent increase in the robbery rate 
following a one-percentage point increase in the proportion of relatively poor 
with an income below 10 percent of median income. 
The 90
th percentile produce positive coefficients for all the property crime 
categories, but it is only a significant determinant of the number of auto thefts. 
The positive sign on the 90
th percentile coefficient possibly suggests that the 
90
th percentile serves as a proxy for the supply of theft-worthy goods. The in-
teraction term displays a negative effect on the specific property crime rates as 
well as for overall crime. 
 
Table 7 Basic results, robbery  
   (1)   (2)   (3)  
Relative poverty, 10 percent   9.140**        
   (4.149)        
Relative poverty, 20 percent      7.139*     
      (3.907)     
Relative poverty, 40 percent         3.684  
         (3.603)  
90
th percentile   8.2e-06   7.7e-06   5.3e-06  
   (6.5e-06)   (6.8e-06)   (7.0e-06)  
Interaction   -6.6e-05**   -5.7e-05*   -3.4e-05  
   (3.2e-05)   (3.0e-05)   (2.8e-05)  
Unemployment   4.360***   4.373***   4.714***  
   (1.514)   (1.530)   (1.541)  
Males aged 15–24   11.057   12.329*   12.740*  
   (7.207)   (7.169)   (7.196)  
Foreign citizens   -2.522   -2.087   -1.900  
   (2.956)   (2.943)   (2.943)  
Divorced   20.230**   17.548*   17.396*  
   (9.736)   (9.879)   (9.955)  
Adjusted R-square   0.967   0.967   0.967  
Note: The interaction-term is an interaction of the relative poverty measure and the 90
th percentile. Standard 
errors are in parenthesis. All standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity. In addition to the variables 
shown in the table, all regressions include a complete set of municipality and year effects as well as linear 
county-specific trends. Our complete panel consists of 588 observations for 21 counties during the period 
1973–2000. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively. 
 
Concerning the link between unemployment and crime it is clear that the 
unemployment rate has a strong effect on the number of auto thefts and the 
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robbery rate, where the coefficients on unemployment are significant at the 
one-percent level. The results imply that a one-percentage point increase in the 
unemployment rate would raise the number of auto thefts and the robbery rate 
with approximately 4.7 and 4.4 percent respectively. These results correspond 
to the findings in Nilsson and Agell (2003), where a one-percentage point drop 
in the unemployment rate is found to decrease the number of auto thefts with 
3.9 percent. For burglary, on the other hand, we estimate a marginally signifi-
cant coefficient on the unemployment rate of 1.5 while Nilsson and Agell 
(2003) report a larger coefficient of 2.8.  
The proportion of men aged 15–24 seems to be a marginal determinant of 
the robbery rate whereas the proportion of the population that are divorced 
seems to be a main determinant for all the specific property crime categories 
considered here. The magnitude of the coefficients on the proportion of di-
vorced individuals is surprisingly large, it seems quite implausible that a one-
percentage point decrease in that proportion of the population would decrease 
the number of auto thefts with 40 percent, everything else held constant. There 
might be an upward bias in these coefficients caused by e.g. simultaneity bias. 
Excluding the variable from the specification does, however, not seem to alter 
the estimated coefficients on the earnings variables, which are our main con-
cern. The estimated coefficients on the proportion of divorced individuals are 
most likely over-estimated but they nonetheless point at a potential 
criminogenic effect of unstable families.  
To sum up, the proportion of relatively poor seems to have a strong effect 
on both the overall crime rate and the specific property crime categories al-
though increasing the proportion to be considered relatively poor decreases the 
magnitude of the coefficient. An increase of the 90
th percentile would also raise 
the number of crimes, possibly reflecting a greater supply of theft-worthy 
goods, although the effect seems to be small. Concerning the link between 
unemployment and crime it is clear that the unemployment rate has a strong 
effect on the overall crime rate as well as for the incidence of auto theft and 
robbery. 
In this baseline specification we have chosen to compare the earnings of the 
people at the bottom of the income distribution with the earnings of the high-
income group in an attempt to take the full distribution of earnings into ac-
count. However, it could also be of interest to compare the low-income group 
with the earnings in the middle of the distribution. Such a specification would 
be more in line with the model in line with the model in section 2. Table 8 
  19presents the results from including the county mean income in the specification 
instead of the 90
th percentile and the interaction term. The results for the 
proportion of the population in relative poverty is now weaker while all other 
control variables show more or less similar results. Keep in mind, however, 
that the mean income will, in contrast with the 90
th percentile, depend on the 
size of the low-income group. Consequently, it seems like it is the size of the 
low-income group together with the earnings of the high-income group that are 
successful in determining property crime rates in Sweden. 
 
Table 8 Alternative baseline specification  
   Overall crime   Burglary   Auto theft   Robbery  
Relative poverty, 10 %   0.547   -0.093   0.436   1.051  
   (0.465)   (0.760)   (1.363)   (1.224)  
Log of mean income   -0.202   -0.154   -0.634   -0.064  
   (.1506)   (0.260)   (0.463)   (0.441)  
Unemployment   1.187**   1.936**   6.536***   5.196***  
   (0.581)   (0.874)   (1.907)   (1.620)  
Males aged 15–24   2.524   -0.761   -3.556   11.166  
   (2.415)   (3.773)   (6.807)   (6.985)  
Foreign citizens   2.829**   -0.783   -2.741   -1.717  
   (1.230)   (2.114)   (3.730)   (2.919)  
Divorced   16.727***   33.925***   53.951***   23.501***  
   (2.803)   (4.804)   (9.279)   (7.864)  
Adjusted R-square   0.968   0.926   0.933   0.967  
Observations   588   588   588   588  
Note: Standard errors are in parenthesis. All standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity. In addition to the 
variables shown in the table, all regressions include a complete set of municipality and year effects as well as 
linear county-specific trends. Our complete panel consists of 588 observations for 21 counties during the 
period 1973–2000. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively. 
 
5 Alternative  specifications 
5.1  Income inequality and violent crime 
Although the economic theory of crime primarily seems appropriate for exam-
ining the determinants of property crime we also report results for the violent 
crime category assault, since we find it interesting to compare the effects. Table 
9 presents the results from the same specifications as in the analysis of the 
property crime categories. It reveals that the determinants of violent crime are 
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quite different from those of property crime. The coefficient on the proportion 
of relatively poor is small, insignificant and even negative when we increase 
the earnings ceiling to be considered relatively poor from 10 to 20 percent of 
median income. The 90
th percentile exhibits a negative sign compared to the 
positive one for property crime and the interaction term also has the opposite 
sign to the one reported above. The unemployment rate seems to have no effect 
on the assault rate, nor does the proportion of foreign citizens or the proportion 
of divorced individuals. The only variable included in the specification that 
seems to have a statistically significant effect on assault is the proportion of 
men aged 15–24. 
  
Table 9 Basic results, assault  
   (1)   (2)   (3)  
Relative poverty, 10 percent   0.115        
   (1.598)        
Relative poverty, 20 percent      -0.134     
      (1.515)     
Relative poverty, 40 percent         -0.394  
         (1.468)  
90
th percentile   -4.0e-06   -4.6e-06   -5.4e-06*  
   (2.7e-06)   (2.8e-06)   (3.0e-06)  
Interaction   1.2e-05   1.2e-05   1.3e-05  
   (1.2e-05)   (1.2e-05)   (1.1e-05)  
Unemployment   0.024   -0.016   -0.121  
   (0.732)   (0.738)   (0.749)  
Males aged 15–24   14.222***   14.819***   15.005***  
   (3.441)   (3.451)   (3.489)  
Foreign citizens   1.467   1.828   2.202  
   (1.426)   (1.439)   (1.453)  
Divorced   5.420   4.353   3.862  
   (4.831)   (4.832)   (4.968)  
Adjusted R-square   0.976   0.976   0.976  
Note: The interaction-term is an interaction of the relative poverty measure and the 90
th percentile. Standard 
errors are in parenthesis. All standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity. In addition to the variables 
shown in the table, all regressions include a complete set of municipality and year effects as well as linear 
county-specific trends. Our complete panel consists of 588 observations for 21 counties during the period 
1973–2000. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively. 
 
  215.2 Alternative  measures  of income inequality 
When thinking about measures of income inequality the first that comes to 
mind are perhaps the Gini-coefficient and some percentile quotient like the 
90
th/10
th. However, it seems that these variables are uncorrelated with the crime 
rate. Running similar specifications as in section 4, including fixed effects, 
county-specific trends and control variables but letting the Gini-coefficient or 
the 90
th/10
th percentile quotient together with mean earnings control for the 
income distribution, the Gini-coefficient and the percentile quotient turn out 
insignificant. Even when letting the Gini-coefficient and the percentile quotient 
be the only variables reflecting the income distribution, i.e. excluding the mean 
earnings measure from the specification, they give inconclusive results. 
However, we might not expect an overall income inequality measure like the 
Gini-coefficient to capture the changes in the income distribution that are most 
important in determining crime rates. As mentioned above, the size of the low-
income group together with the earnings of the high-income group seem to 
matter most in determining property crime. 
 
5.3 Deterrence  variables 
Examining the effect of deterrence variables on crime should be done with 
caution since there is a potential problem of reverse causation. For example, in 
a county where crime is rising there might be an increase in police hirings in an 
attempt to stop the increasing crime rate. Consequently, there will be a causal 
and positive effect of crime on the number of police officers, which will gener-
ate an upward bias in our OLS estimate of the coefficient on the police re-
sources variable. Furthermore, an increase in the crime rate, keeping the num-
ber of police officers constant, is likely to cause a reduction in the clear-up rate. 
That is to say that there will be a causal and negative effect of crime on the 
clear-up rate causing a downward bias in the coefficient on the clear-up rate. 
Although there are apparent problems with drawing conclusions on how police 
resources and clear-up rates affect the crime rate we still include these 
deterrence variables in the specification to check whether the omission of them 
in previous sections has lead to biased coefficients on the earnings variables.  
For each county The National Police Board provided us with data on the 
number of police officers per 100,000 residents and The National Council for 
  22     




Table 10 Deterrence variables  
   Overall crime   Burglary   Auto theft   Robbery  
Clear-up rate   -0.056   -0.024   -0.266   -0.061  
   (0.235)   (0.070)   (0.255)   (0.078)  
Police resources   6.4e-05   -0.0005   1.7e-05   0.0003  
   (0.0002)   (0.0004)   (0.0005)   (0.0005)  
Relative poverty, 10 %   3.290***   5.389***   20.793***   11.390***  
   (1.239)   (2.030)   (3.718)   (4.278)  
90
th percentile   4.5e-06**   6.6e-06*   2.1e-05***   8.4e-06  
   (2.3e-06)   (3.9e-06)   (7.1e-06)   (6.9e-06)  
Interaction   -1.9e-05*   -4.8e-05***   -0.0002***   -8.1e-05  
   (1.0e-05)   (1.5e-05)   (2.9e-05)   (3.2e-05)  
Unemployment   1.048*   0.961   5.056***   3.397**  
   (0.607)   (0.893)   (1.681)   (1.555)  
Males aged 15–24   1.840   -2.632   -4.849   5.951  
   (2.665)   (3.962)   (6.515)   (7.588)  
Foreign citizens   1.009   -5.937**   -8.997**   -0.818  
   (1.607)   (2.652)   (3.846)   (3.892)  
Divorced   15.961***   34.820***   55.768***   11.496  
   (5.162)   (7.354)   (11.665)   (13.158)  
Adj. R-square   0.966   0.931   0.943   0.969  
Observations   546   546   546   543  
Note: The interaction-term is an interaction of the relative poverty measure and the 90
th percentile. Standard 
errors are in parenthesis. All standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity. In addition to the variables 
shown in the table, all regressions include a complete set of municipality and year effects as well as linear 
county-specific trends. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively. Our 
complete panel consists of 588 observations for 21 counties during the period 1973–2000. However, we only 
have access to data on the clear-up rate since 1975 for burglary and auto theft and since 1976 for assault. 
 
Table 10 presents the result from including the crime-specific clear-up rate and 
the county-specific measure of police resources in the baseline specification. 
Briefly considering the results for the deterrence variables, it should be noted 
                                                      
15 The clear-up rate is measured as the percentage of all reported crimes (in one specific cate-
gory) that are solved the same year that they are reported. 
  23that all coefficients are statistically insignificant. However, concentrating on 
the signs of the coefficients we find that the coefficient on police resources is 
negative for burglary but positive for overall crime, auto theft and robbery. 
Since we suspected there to be an upward bias in our OLS estimate of the 
coefficient on police, the negative coefficient on police for burglary most likely 
reflects a true negative relationship between the number of police officers and 
the burglary rate although we cannot determine how large the effect is.
16 
The 
coefficients on the clear-up rate are all negative, but since we were concerned 
with a potential downward bias of this coefficient we cannot say anything 
about the relationship between the clear-up rate and the number of crimes. 
Focusing on the earnings variables, the results look quite similar to those 
presented in section 4. Consequently, the omission of deterrence variables in 
previous sections seems to have caused no problem with biased coefficients on 
our earnings variables. 
 
5.4 Dynamics 
Crime rates tend to be persistent over time. Unobserved heterogeneity and 
neighborhood effects can most likely explain a large proportion of this inertia.
17 
By including time and area fixed effects and county-specific trends in the 
specification we have done our best in trying to control for unobserved hetero-
geneity. However, we have so far not taken peer effects into account. The ex-
istence of peer effects will result in crime rates differing from the rates pre-
dicted by the characteristics of the geographical area. The idea is that an indi-
vidual’s decision to become a criminal will depend on whether people in the 
same neighborhood commit crime. Such effects would not be captured in a 
standard static model and the model would therefore not be able to explain the 
crime rate. 
One way of controlling for social interactions is to introduce dynamics into 
the model, i.e. include a lagged dependent variable in the specification.
18 
With 
our panel, including 28 years, any bias from including a lagged dependent vari-
                                                      
16 Levitt (1997) instruments the effect of police on crime with the timing of mayoral and 
gubernatorial elections and shows that increases in police substantially reduce violent crime but 
have a smaller impact on property crime. The validity of these results is however questioned in 
McCrary (2002). 
17 Glaeser et al (1996) emphasize the role of local social interactions in determining crime rates 
in the U.S. 
18 This has, for example, been done by Fajnzylber et al (1998) and Machin and Meghir (2000). 
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able into the specification should be minimal, see Nickell (1981). Table 11 
presents the results from including a one-year lag of the county crime rate in 
the specification. The coefficients on the lagged dependent variable reveal a 
significant (at the one-percent level) persistence in county crime rates. Consid-
ering the earnings variables the coefficients are now overall smaller than in the 
static model. However, most results remain.  
 
Table 11 Dynamics  
   Overall crime   Burglary   Auto theft   Robbery  
Lagged dep. variable    0.292***   0.403***   0.569***   0.148***  
   (0.052)   (0.051)   (0.035)   (0.048)  
Relative poverty, 10 %   1.813*   2.674   9.353***   7.899**  
   (1.085)   (1.851)   (2.821)   (3.910)  
90
th percentile   3.6e-06   3.3e-06   1.4e-05***   7.6e-06  
   (2.0e-06)   (3.3e-06)   (4.4e-06)   (6.2e-06)  
Interaction   -9.2e-06   -2.4e-05*   -7.8e-05***   -5.9e-05**  
   (8.2e-06)   (1.4e-05)   (2.2e-05)   (2.9e-05)  
Unemployment   0.895   0.598   1.256   3.770***  
   (0.588)   (0.794)   (1.266)   (1.508)  
Males aged 15–24   0.744   -1.397   -2.096   9.161  
   (2.481)   (3.568)   (5.129)   (7.267)  
Foreign citizens   1.388   -1.521   -3.524   -2.283  
   (1.180)   (1.890)   (2.519)   (2.922)  
Divorced   16.954***   23.597***   36.782***   18.262*  
   (3.770)   (5.620)   (7.660)   (9.540)  
Adj. R-square   0.971   0.939   0.960   0.968  
Observations   588   588   588   588  
Note: The interaction-term is an interaction of the relative poverty measure and the 90
th percentile. Standard 
errors are in parenthesis. All standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity. In addition to the variables 
shown in the table, all regressions include a complete set of municipality and year effects as well as linear 
county-specific trends. Our complete panel consists of 588 observations for 21 counties during the period 
1973–2000. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively. 
 
The proportion of relatively poor still has a significant positive effect on both 
the overall crime rate, the number of auto thefts and the robbery rate. A one-
percentage point increase in the proportion of the population with an income 
below 10 percent of median income seems to induce an increase in the overall 
crime rate of 1.8 percent. Although the magnitude of the coefficients on the 
earnings variables is smaller than in the previous section it should be noted that 
  25these coefficients only measure the short-run effect on crime. The long-run 
effects will be very close to the coefficients calculated above, considering the 




The unique aspect of this paper is that we have access to detailed income in-
formation during a long time-period, which contains considerable variations in 
the income distribution. The rich income data allows us to construct various 
measures of earnings inequality helping us to evaluate how different segments 
of the distribution of earnings affect crime rates.  
Our main results can be summarized as follows. First, the proportion of 
relatively poor seems to have a strong effect on both the overall crime rate and 
the specific property crime categories. A one-percentage point increase in the 
proportion of the population with an income below 10 percent of the median 
income would increase the overall crime rate with 2.9 percent, the burglary rate 
with 5.9 percent, the number of auto thefts with 22.1 and the robbery rate with 
9.1 percent, everything else held constant. Increasing the proportion to be 
considered relatively poor decreases the magnitude of the coefficient until the 
coefficients are small enough compared to the standard errors to become 
insignificant. Furthermore, our results indicate that it is the size of the low-
income group together with the earnings of the high-income group that are 
successful in determining property crime rates in Sweden. 
Second, there is an unambiguous link between unemployment and property 
crime. According to our results, a one-percentage point drop in the unemploy-
ment rate would decrease the overall crime rate, the number of auto thefts and 
the robbery rate with approximately 1.1, 4.7 and 4.4 percent respectively. 
These results are consistent with the findings in Nilsson and Agell (2003) 
where a one-percentage point drop in the unemployment rate is found to de-
                                                      
19 Consider a dynamic specification where the crime rate is a function of the lagged dependent 
variable, income inequality (x) and other control variables (z),  t t t t z x y y 2 1 1 β β α + + = − . To 











2 1 . Consequently, the long-run effect of a one-percentage point change in 
the proportion of relatively poor on the number of auto thefts would, according to our results in 
Table 10, be 21.7 percent, which can be compared to the coefficient 22.1 shown in Table 6. 
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crease the overall crime rate and the number of auto thefts with 1.2 and 3.9 
percent respectively.  
Third, the results look different for the violent crime category assault. The 
coefficient on the proportion of relatively poor is small, insignificant and even 
negative when we increase the earnings ceiling to be considered relatively poor 
from 10 to 20 percent of the median income. The unemployment rate seems to 
have no effect on the assault rate, nor does the proportion of foreign citizens or 
the proportion of divorced individuals. The only variable that seems to have an 
effect on assault is the proportion of men aged 15–24. Finally, the omission of 
deterrence variables in the baseline specification appears to have caused no 
problem with biased coefficients on our earnings variables. Moreover, our 
empirical findings suggest that Swedish crime rates suffer from a high degree 
of inertia. 
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Appendix  
A.1 Deriving the earnings measure 
All earnings measures on county-level are derived using the individual earnings 
measure in LINDA for all men aged 25–64. The earnings measure included in 
LINDA has not been entirely consistent throughout the period. Since 1974 it is 
possible to construct a measure that is consistent the remaining period with 
some small corrections. 1973 we calculate earnings by adding income from 
employment (A-inkomst av tjänst + Beskattningsbar sjöinkomst) and income 
from business (A-inkomst av jordbruk + A-inkomst av rörelse). The earnings 
measure for the period 1974–1977 is constructed adding the same income vari-
ables, from employment and business, as for the previous period and then sub-
tracting the sum of pensions (Pension), unemployment compensation (Dag-
penning vid arbetslöshet + KAS), and compensation during labor market train-
ing (Utbildningsbidrag). 1978–2000 the earnings measure is directly available 
in the data with some minor adjustments. 
 
A.2 Definitions  of  variables 
 
Table A1 Definitions of crime variables  
Variables   Definitions  
All crimes   All crimes reported in the county during one year.  
Burglary   All burglary, not including firearms.  
Auto theft   All auto thefts, both attempted and completed.  
Robbery   All robberies, with and without the use of firearms.  
Assault   All assaults, not with fatal ending.  
Note: The crime data were provided by The National Council for Crime Prevention (BRÅ). 
  
  31Table A2 Definitions of earnings variables (annual earnings in 1980 SEK)  
Variables   Definitions  
10
th
 percentile   The county-specific 10
th
 percentile.  
90
th
 percentile   The county-specific 90
th
 percentile.  
Gini-coefficient   The county-specific Gini-coefficient.  
Proportion in relative poverty   Proportion of the population with earnings less than 40 per-
cent of median earnings in the county.  
Mean earnings   Mean earnings in each county.     
Note: All earnings measures on county-level are calculated using the individual earnings measure in LINDA 
for all men aged 25–64. 
  
Table A3 Definitions of control variables  
Variables   Definitions  
Unemployment   The proportion unemployed of the county labor force.  
Proportion of males aged 15–
24  
Proportion of males aged 15–24 of each county population.  
Proportion  foreign  citizens    Proportion of the population in each county that are not 
Swedish citizens.  
Proportion divorced   Proportion of the population in each county that are divorced.  
Police officers   Number of employed police officers per 100,000 inhabitants.  
Clear-up rates   The percentage of all reported crimes (in one specific cate-
gory) that are solved the same year that they are reported.  
Note: The data on unemployment, the proportion of males aged 15–24, the proportion of foreign citizens and 
the proportion divorced were provided by Statistics Sweden. The National Police Board provided us with 
data on the number of police officers per 100,000 residents and The National Council for Crime Prevention 
provided us with data on clear-up rates for different crime categories. 
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